4 - BERTRAND (Henri-Gatien, Count)

BERTRAND (Henri-Gatien, Count) Alexandria, 12 Floréal, Year IX [May 2, 1801].. Autograph signed letter to his comrades in the Corps of Engineers in Egypt. 6 pp., in-8 (23 x 16.4 cm). An interesting letter to Count Charles Marie Benjamin Hautpoul criticizing the operations of General Menou, the last commander-in-chief of the French army in Egypt, following the defeat at the Battle of Canopus on March 21, 1801. Bertrand laments the division of the French army into three parts, which, in his view, prevented them from taking advantage of the British army’s slowness. “We were up against a very slow enemy, and their operation was very poorly coordinated with the Turks—which hardly surprises me, for it is not easy to make them move as one pleases. What advantages we would have if we took advantage of this. Unfortunately, the army is divided into three roughly equal parts, none of which can undertake any action.” He emphasized the tactic of “gathering all their troops at one point and then moving them rapidly to another,” taking advantage of the “superior marching speed of the French infantry”—a tactic successfully employed by Bonaparte in Italy and Frederick II in Germany. This tactic, he argued, could have led to the defeat of the Ottomans: “This well-established principle had a very natural application here. A victory over the Ottomans was as easy as it was advantageous; it would have maintained peace in the country […]. Once rid of the Ottomans, we would have had only the English to contend with, who would not have been able to reorganize a Turkish army for a long time, and I believe they would have been in a very difficult position. They have only two options: either take Alexandria or destroy the army; they need not worry about anything that does not lead them there.” He goes on to detail his plan, focusing first on assembling a sufficient number of men: “I believe it is possible to assemble a force of 7,000 to 8,000 men while leaving a sufficient garrison in Alexandria,” as well as shifting the battle to open ground; allowing the French army to make use of its cavalry: “Our superiority lies in our artillery and cavalry, which they hold in high regard—and rightly so—and although they appear to be recruiting horses, they cannot quickly train them for either draft work or maneuvers. All reasons therefore point to engaging in battle on the plain.” He concludes by lamenting General Menou’s decisions, despite having advised him: “I have often shared these ideas—which, incidentally, are those of many people, yours as well as mine—with several generals and others in whom I assumed the Commander-in-Chief [Menou] might have some confidence. During the short walk we took after dinner, in front of his tent, I emphasized the ease and advantages of a victory over the Ottomans; that was then, as it is today, the idea I held dearest. I was truly sorry about the course of action that was taken .” Powerless in the face of Menou’s decisions, Bertrand tries to maintain hope for a victory against the English army. “An army split into three parts, none of which can act, and two of which—especially yours—are in grave danger. For a few days, I was unable to come to terms with it. Today I am trying to be patient; perhaps the enemy’s slowness will give us time to make up for the time we’ve lost.” However, the defeat at the Battle of Canopus would have a decisive impact on the army’s morale and its chances of victory. General Menou retreated to Alexandria, where the English army laid siege to him. Cornered, he surrendered on August 31, 1801. Skillful restoration of the last page, which was torn into four pieces, without damaging the text. Complete transcription available upon request.